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National Intelligence Daily Cable for Wednesday March 9, 1977.

The NID Cable is for the purpose of informing senior US officials.

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	CUBA-US: Human Rights
K1	Cuba has begun a campaign in its press aimed at calling attention to alleged questionable human rights practices in the US. President Castro probably wants to signal the US that the human rights issue can be a two-edged sword and that, while he may be willing to discuss the issue in a general way with the US, the subject of Cuban political prisoners should not be pressed in any negotiations.
X1	Both the official daily <i>Granma</i> and the Cuban news agency Prensa Latina are using material originated by Cubans as well as items from the Soviet news agency Tass that highlight alleged US violations of human rights.
X1	An article in <i>Granma</i> last week quoted a report from a US medical association that denounced substandard hygienic conditions in US penitentiaries. The Cuban paper also reproduced a Tass report that harshly criticized the US for not defending human rights in "countries where it had helped establish dictatorial regimes," such as Chile. Cuba's communist youth newspaper has taken the US to task for its activities in Vietnam.
X1	The campaign is a reaction to official US comments on the human rights situation in Cuba.
X1	Rafael Rodriguez, the number-three man in the Cuban hierarchy, reiterated Cuba's official position in a BBC-TV interview last month that there are no political prisoners in Cuba.
X1	NAMIBIA: Constitutional Talks
X1 •	An interim government in Namibia could be established in the next several months-before South Africa comes under in-

ternational pressure to negotiate with the South-West Africa Peoples Organization. SWAPO is recognized by the UN and OAU as

the authentic representative of Namibia.

25X1 The so-called Turnhalle conference--the multiracial constitutional talks on an interim government that would lead Namibia to full independence--reconvened last week in full plenary session for the first time in several months. The one white and 10 nonwhite delegations are reviewing those parts of the proposed constitution that have been approved by consensus of a small drafting committee. The committee is now concentrating on one remaining problem the functions of the prime minister, or chairman of the council of ministers. The committee last week quickly reached a consensus 25X1 that a proposed bill of rights, which might have seriously eroded apartheid in Namibia, would not be legally enforceable. Instead, a constitutional court will merely advise the various levels of government, if requested, whether a law might conflict with the bill of rights. The nonwhite delegates clearly are unhappy, but reportedly realize that this compromise was necessary to keep the talks moving. 25X1 The compromise may also have overcome another potential stumbling block. White leaders had called for a referendum in the white community to approve the final Turnhalle proposals. Provision of an enforceable bill of rights might have led to white rejection of the proposal and the breakup of the conference. 25X1 The referendum will presumably still take place as soon as the conference ends, possibly because South African Prime Minister Vorster wants to ease the concerns of his conservative supporters and thus facilitate passage through the South African parliament of enabling legislation for the in-

25X1 From the beginning of the Turnhalle conference in the fall of 1975, Vorster seemed willing to let it drift along.

Last fall, however, some nonwhite delegates threatened to break up the talks over continued white stonewalling. Vorster reluc-

terim government.

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up the talks over continued white stonewalling. Vorster reluctantly intervened to prevent a collapse of the conference.

We believe that Vorster had determined by the end of last year that it was time to forge ahead. When Turnhalle resumed in January, the delegates were probably given to understand that Vorster wanted progress. During the past two months,

several thorny issues have been resolved, mostly by compromise on the part of the nonwhites, who probably believe a government of their own devising is preferable to one imposed from outside.
Vorster also views the new US administration as determined to see Namibian independence realized through an international conference at which SWAPO is representedSWAPO is not participating in the Turnhalle talks. Vorster would thus probably prefer to establish Namibia's interim government and use fait accompli as a bargaining lever in future internationally sponsored negotiations.
He may also believe that SWAPO will not be able to mount much of a guerrilla offensive for many months, and that international pressure would therefore force SWAPO president Sar Nujoma to negotiate on terms more acceptable to South Africa than those Nujoma has insisted on since last year.
This course of action is risky for South Africa. The nonwnite population may be unwilling to accept Turnhalle's likely formulaa loose federal system that would enable whites to retain control of the country's rich mineral resources. In addition, Vorster could be underestimating SWAPO's capability. There is a good possibility that SWAPO will be able to begin a serious insurgent effort within the next several months. While South Africa will be able to deal militarily with any increased activity SWAPO can mount, Vorster will face additional political pressures he does not need, primarily from abroad, such as the UN.
RHODESIA: Nkomo's Military Plans
Joshua Nkomo's Zimbabwe African People's Union is trying to improve its military capabilities and expand its rela-

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tively small guerrilla force. Although ZAPU has increased its recruiting in recent months, its guerrillas are much less numerous and its military activities in western Rhodesia are on a much smaller scale than those of the Zimbabwe African National

Union in eastern Rhodesia.

Nkomo probably past week while e asked the Sovie	he was in the	ermany. H

favorable. We estimate that less than 4 percent of grains sown last fall have so far been lost to winterkill. Total winterkill

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Prospects for Soviet winter grains in 1977 remain

loss last year exceeded 25 percent, and normal winter losses run about 16 percent. In contrast to last year, the fall-sown crops this year went into dormancy in good condition with favorable plant development and high soil-moisture reserves. Since mid-February, warm temperatures in the southern part of European USSR have caused the resumption of vegetative growth in Moldavia, the southern Ukraine, and the northern Caucasus. Crops in these regions have lost their winter hardiness, and about one third of the winter grain area now is vulnerable to cold snaps that frequently occur in March and April. Weather conditions through mid-June will determine the final size of the crop. Winter grains were sown on about 38.5 million hectares, the largest area sown since 1968 and 1 million hectares greater than last year. Normally, fall-sown grains account for one third of total Soviet grain output. ROMANIA: Ceausescu's African Trip President Ceausescu stressed Romania's third world ties and sought expanded bilateral trade during his 12-day trip to Africa, which ended on Saturday just before the earthquake. It was Ceausescu's first trip to Africa in three years. He visited Mauritania, Senegal, Ghana, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria and was accompanied by foreign affairs and industrial officials. The regime is presumably pleased with the visits. At every opportunity, Ceausescu highlighted Romania's support for a new international economic order and the elimination of colonialism, racism, and apartheid. He also emphasized noninterference in internal affairs, national sovereignty, equal rights among states, and renunciation of the use or threat of force in interstate relations. While the Soviets have come to expect such language from the Romanians, they nonetheless will find

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it irritating.

25X1	At each stop, the Romanians signed trade or economic protocols pledging greater bilateral cooperation. Romania agreed to reschedule Ghana's \$1.4-million debt, and established a joint economic commission with the Ivorians. Ceausescu may have secured increased supplies of raw materials, but he apparently could not convince the Nigerians to sell oil to Romania.
25X1	Ceausescu hopes that the trip will help to secure African support for Romania's bid to become an "observer" in the nonaligned movement. In the past, some African states strongly opposed Bucharest's candidacy, and, at last August's summit in Colombo, Romania was admitted only as a "guest."
25X1	BRAZIL: Technology Transfer
25X1	//Brazil will probably choose a French proposal for construction of a large petrochemical facility over other proposals because the French bid encompasses more effective technology transfer. The \$30-million contract will be the initial step in construction of a \$1.2-billion complex.//
25X1	//The research arm of the Brazilian state petro- chemical company, Centas, evaluated the technology transfer elements of the various proposals. Although we do not know the specific criteria used, they probably included the amount of local engineering to be used, training to be provided, and the actual level of the technology.//
25X1	The French firms apparently accurately perceived Brazil's attitude toward technology transfer and geared their proposal accordingly.
25X1	The Brazilians have explicit criteria for judging the likely effectiveness of technology transfers, and these judgments evidently can be decisive in contract awards. This is not only a measure of Brazilian sophistication about technology transfer but is an example of the importance international technology transfer is assuming among the more advanced developing nations.

	LIBYA-EGYPT: Relations	
5X1 [Radio Tripoli reported on Sunday that Egyptian author- ities had closed the border between Libya and Egypt. The Lib- yans also said the Egyptians were interfering with Libyan air- craft and had turned back a number of scheduled flights.	
5X1	The immediate cause of the Egyptian actions probably was a speech by Libyan leader Qadhafi at last week's People's General Congress in which he denounced the Sadat regime as corrupt and as the puppet of the US CIA. Qadhafi also said Libya stands ready to come to the aid of the "downtrodden masses of Egypt."	25X
5X1	A Libyan media campaign against Egypt has been in full swing since the popular demonstrations and riots in Egypt in mid-January. Libyan broadcasts beamed to Egypt appear to be aimed at inciting students into demonstrating against the government.	
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Egypt was expecting more Egyptians to be expelled from Libya in the near future including all Egyptian teachers in the primary school system and most Egyptian technicians in senior positions in the Libyan government.

an increasing number of Egyptian residents in Libya, mainly professional people, were turning in their passports in order to accept Libyan nationality, allegedly under pressure from the Libyan government.//

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